Abstract-In analogy to the well-known notion of finite-state compressibility of individual sequences, due to Lempel and Ziv, we define a similar notion of "finite-state encryptability" of an individual plaintext sequence, as the minimum asymptotic key rate that must be consumed by finite-state encrypters so as to guarantee perfect secrecy in a well-defined sense. Our main basic result is that the finite-state encryptability is equal to the finite-state compressibility for every individual sequence. This is in parallelism to Shannon's classical probabilistic counterpart result, asserting that the minimum required key rate is equal to the entropy rate of the source. However, the redundancy, defined as the gap between the upper bound (direct part) and the lower bound (converse part) in the encryption problem, turns out to decay at a different rate (in fact, much slower) than the analogous redundancy associated with the compression problem. We also extend our main theorem, allowing: (i) availability of side information (SI) at the encrypter/decrypter/eavesdropper, (ii) lossy reconstruction at the decrypter.
I. INTRODUCTION
The paradigm of individual sequences and finite-state machines (FSMs), as an alternative to the traditional probabilistic modeling of sources and channels, has been studied and explored quite extensively in several information-theoretic problem areas, including data compression [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] , [19] , source/channel simulation [5] , [10] , classification [18] , [20] , prediction [2] , [21] , denoising [11] , and even channel coding [4] , just to name a few representative references. On the other hand, it is fairly safe to say that the entire literature on information-theoretic security (see, e.g., [3] , [6] , [12] for surveys as well as references therein), is based exclusively on the probabilistic setting.
To the best of our knowledge, the only exception to this rule is [14] . In that work, the plaintext source to be encrypted, using a secret key, is an individual sequence, the encrypter is a general encoder, and the eavesdropper employs an FSM as a message discriminator. Specifically, it is postulated in [14] that the eavesdropper has prior knowledge that can be expressed in terms of the existence of some set of "acceptable messages" that constitutes the a-priori level of uncertainty that the eavesdropper has concerning the plaintext message. Next, it is assumed that there exists an FSM that can test whether a given candidate plaintext message is acceptable: Iff the FSM produces the all-zero sequence in response to that message, then this message is acceptable. Perfect security is then defined as a situation where the size of the acceptance set is not reduced in the presence of the cryptogram. The main result in [14] is that the asymptotic key rate needed for perfectly secure encryption in that sense, cannot be smaller (up to asymptotically vanishing terms) than the Lempel-Ziv (LZ) complexity of the plaintext source [19] . This lower bound is obviously asymptotically achieved by one-time pad encryption of the bit-stream obtained by LZ data compression of the plaintext source.
In this work, we also consider encryption of individual sequences, but our modeling approach and the definition of perfect secrecy are different. Rather than assuming that the encrypter and decrypter have unlimited resources, and that it is the eavesdropper which has limited resources, modeled in terms of FSMs, in our setting, the converse is true. We adopt a model of a finite-state encrypter, which receives as inputs the plaintext stream and the secret key bitstream, and it produces a ciphertext. Based on this model, we define a notion of finitestate encryptability (in analogy to the notions of finite-state compressibility [19] and the finite-state predictability [2] ), as the minimum achievable rate at which key bits must be consumed by any finite-state encrypter in order to guarantee perfect security, while keeping the cryptogram decipherable at the legitimate receiver. Our main result is that the finitestate encryptability is equal to the finite-state compressibility, similarly as in [14] . More precisely, denoting by c(x n ) the number of LZ phrases associated with the plaintext x n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we show that the number of key bits required by any encrypter with s states, normalized by n cannot be smaller than [c(x n ) log c(x n )]/n − δ s (n), where δ s (n) = O(s log(log n)/ log n). On the other hand, this bound is obviously essentially achievable by applying the LZ '78 algorithm [19] , followed by one-time pad encryption, since the compression ratio of the LZ '78 algorithm is also [c(x n ) log c(x n )]/n, up to vanishingly small terms. It follows then that the finite-state encryptability of every (infinite) individual sequence is equal to its finite-state compressibility.
While the idea of LZ data compression, followed by onetime padding is rather straightforward, our main result, that no finite-state encrypter can do better than that for any given individual sequence, may not be quite obvious since the operations of compression and encryption are basically different -secret key encryption need not necessarily be based on compression followed by one-time padding, definitely not if both operations are formalized in the framework of finitestate machines.
For finite sequences of length n, the difference between the upper bound (of the direct part) and the lower bound (of the converse part), which can be thought of as some notion of redundancy, is again O(s log(log n)/ log n), which decays much more slowly than the corresponding redundancy in data compression [19, Theorems 1, 2] , which is roughly O((log s)/ log n). Finally, we extend our main basic theorem in two directions. The first is in allowing availability of side information (SI) at all three parties (encrypter, legitimate decrypter and eavesdropper) or at the decrypter and the eavesdropper only. We assume that the SI sequence is an individual sequence as well. We initially assume that it is the same SI that is available to all three parties in the first case or to both the legitimate decrypter and the eavesdropper, in the second case. Our main result is essentially unaltered, except that the LZ complexity,
/n, is replaced by the conditional LZ complexity given the SI, to be defined later (see also [7] , [17] ). Our second extension is to the case where lossy reconstruction is allowed at the legitimate receiver (first, without SI). Here the LZ complexity is replaced by a notion of "LZ rate-distortion function," r LZ (D; x n ), which means the smallest LZ complexity among all sequences that are within the allowed distortion relative to the input plaintext sequence. While our framework allows randomized reconstruction sequences (that may depend on the random key), we find that at least asymptotically, there is nothing to gain from this degree of freedom, as optimum performance can be achieved by a scheme that generates deterministic reproductions. Finally, we make a few short comments on the case where both SI and lossy reconstruction are allowed at the same time.
It should be pointed out that throughout the entire paper, most of our emphasis is on converse theorems (lower bounds). The compatible direct parts (upper bounds) will always be attainable by a straightforward application of the suitable data compression scheme, followed by one-time padding.
II. NOTATION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Throughout this paper, scalar random variables (RV's) will be denoted by capital letters, their sample values will be denoted by the respective lower case letters, and their alphabets will be denoted by the respective calligraphic letters. A similar convention will apply to random vectors and their sample values, which will be denoted with same symbols superscripted by the dimension. Sources and channels will be denoted generically by the letter P or Q, subscripted by the name of the RV and its conditioning, if applicable, exactly like in ordinary textbook notation standards. Information theoretic quantities, like entropies and mutual informations, will be denoted following the usual conventions of the information theory literature, e.g.,
, and so on. A finite-state encrypter is defined by a sixtuplet E = (X , Y, Z, f, g, Δ), where X is a finite input alphabet of size |X | = α, Y is a finite set of binary words, Z is a finite set of states, f : Z × X × {0, 1} * → Y is the output function, g : Z × X → Z is the next-state function, Δ : Z ×X → {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and {0, 1}
* is the set of all binary strings of finite length. The set Y is allowed to contain binary strings of various lengths, including the null word λ (whose length is zero). When two infinite sequences, x = x 1 , x 2 , . . ., x i ∈ X , and u = u 1 , u 2 , . . ., u i ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, . . . are fed into E, it produces an infinite output sequence y = y 1 , y 2 , . . ., y i ∈ Y, while passing through an infinite sequence of states z = z 1 , z 2 , . . ., z i ∈ Z, according to the following recursive equations, implemented for i = 1, 2, . . .
where it is understood that if Δ(z i , x i ) = 0, then k i = λ, the null word of length zero, namely, no key bits are used in the i-th step. By the same token, if y i = λ, no output is produced at this step, i.e., the system is idling and only the state evolves in response to the input. An encrypter with s states E, is one with |Z| = s. It is assumed that x is deterministic (i.e., an individual sequence), whereas u is purely random, i.e., for every positive integer n,
n , k n ), we refer to the vector y n produced by E in response to the inputs x n and k n when the initial state is z 1 . Similarly, the notation g(z 1 , x n ) will mean the state z n+1 and Δ(z 1 , x n ) will designate n i=1 Δ(z i , x i ) under the same circumstances. An encrypter E defined as perfectly secure if for every positive integer n and for every x ∈ X ∞ and y n ∈ Y n , the probability Pr{Y n = y n |x} is independent of x. An encrypter is defined as information lossless (IL) if for every z 1 ∈ Z, every sufficiently large 1 n and all
n . Given E and x n , the encryption key rate of x n w.r.t. E is defined as
where
is the length of the binary string k i and (
is the total length of k n . The set of all perfectly secure, IL encrypters {E} with no 1 It should be pointed out that this definition of information losslessness is more relaxed (and hence more general) than the definition in [19] . While in [19] , the requirement is imposed for every positive integer n, here it is required only for all sufficiently large n. more than s states will be denoted by E(s). Next define
and finally, define the finite-state encryptability of x as
Our purpose it to characterize these quantities and to point out how they can be achieved in principle.
III. MAIN RESULT
Incremental parsing [19] of a string x n is a sequential procedure of parsing x n into distinct phrases, where each new phrase is the shortest string that has not been encountered before as a phrase of x n , with the possible exception of the last phrase that might be incomplete. Let c(x n ) denote the number of phrases in LZ incremental parsing of x n . The LZ complexity of x n is defined as
The finite-state compressibility, ρ(x), of x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .) is defined, in [19] , as the best compression ratio achieved by IL finite-state encoders, analogously to the above definition of finite-state encryptability. From Theorems 1, 2 and 3 of [19] , it follows that ρ LZ (x)
The following theorem establishes a lower bound on σ s (x n ) in terms of ρ LZ (x n ) and hence a lower bound of σ(x) in terms of ρ(x).
Theorem 1:
, where δ s (n) is independent of x n and behaves according to δ s (n) = O(s log(log n)/ log n). Consequently, σ(x) ≥ ρ(x). Discussion. A few comments on Theorem 1 are in order.
1. It is readily observed that a compatible direct theorem holds, simply by applying the LZ '78 algorithm followed by one-time pad encryption of the compressed bits. The resulting key-rate needed is then upper bounded by
, which is, within negligible terms, equal to ρ LZ (x n ). Thus, σ(x) = ρ(x).
2. Consider the difference between the upper bound pertaining to the direct part (as mentioned in item no. 1 above) and the lower bound of the converse part. The behavior of this difference is O(αs log(log n)/ √ log n). This behavior is different from the behavior of the corresponding gap in compression (Theorems 1 and 2 in [19] 
), which is O([log(2α)] log(8αs
2 )/ log n). The guaranteed convergence to optimality is therefore considerably slower in the encryption problem.
3. We already mentioned that the definition of the IL property here is somewhat more relaxed than in [19] (see footnote no. 1). Moreover, it is possible to relax this requirement even further by allowing a relatively small uncertainty in 
Throughout this proof, all information measures are defined w.r.t.
Consider the following chain of equalities for the given x n and an arbitrary encrypter E ∈ E(s):
Note that the length of the key for the i-th m-
, is a variable that may take on no more than (m + 1) αs−1 different values, 2 and hence the same is true concerning the random variable L, and so, H(L) ≤ (αs − 1) log(m + 1). Thus,
Now, for all large m,
where the second equality is due to the perfect security assumption and the third equality is due to the IL property, assuming that m is sufficiently large. Thus, combining eqs. (11) and (12), we obtain
Now, the main term, H(X m )/m, is nothing but the normalized m-th order empirical entropy associated with x n . Next, in order to get rid from the dependence of this main term on m, we further lower bound it in terms of ρ LZ (x n ) at the (small) price of reducing the bound further by additional terms that will be shown later to be negligible. In particular, in [8] , we prove the following inequality:
where n → 0 as n → ∞. Combining this with eq. (13), we get
We now have the freedom to let m = m n grow slowly enough as a function of n such that δ s (n) = δ s (n, m n ) will vanish for every fixed s. By letting m n be proportional to (log n) log(log n), δ s (n) becomes O(s log(log n)/ log n). Note that the first two terms of δ s (n, m) come from considerations pertaining to encryption, whereas the other terms appear also in compression. The second term turns out to be the dominant one, which means that in the encryption problem we end up with slower decay of the redundancy. If we compare the difference between the upper bound and the lower bound in compression (coding them and converse in [19] ), this difference is dominated by a term that is O( ([log(2α) ] log(8αs 2 )/ log n), whereas in encryption the difference is O(αs log(log n)/ log n), namely, a significantly slower decay rate.
IV. EXTENSIONS A. Availability of Side Information
Consider the case where SI is available at the encrypter/decrypter/eavesdropper. Suppose that, in addition to the source sequence x, there is an (individual) SI sequence
The direct is obtained by first, compressing x n to about n · ρ LZ (x n |s n ) bits using the conditional parsing scheme [17, Lemma 2, eq. (A.11)] and then applying one-time pad encryption.
The same performance can be achieved even if the encrypter does not have access to s n , by using a scheme in the spirit of Slepian-Wolf coding: Randomly assign to each member of X n a bin, selected independently at random across the set {1, 2, . . . , 2 nR }. The encrypter applies one-time pad to the (nR)-bit binary representation of the bin index of x n . The decrypter, first decrypts the bin index using the key and then seeks a sequencex n within the given bin, which satisfies ρ LZ (x n |s n ) < R − . If there is one and only one such sequence, then it becomes the decoded message, otherwise an error is declared. This scheme works, just like the ordinary SW coding scheme, because the number of {x n } for which ρ LZ (x n |s n ) < R − does not exceed 2 n[R− +O(log(log n)/ log n)] [17, Lemma 2] . The weakness of this is that prior knowledge of (a tight upper bound on) ρ LZ (x n |s n ) is required. If, for example, it is known that x n is a noisy version of s n , generated, say, by a known additive channel, then R should be essentially the entropy rate of the noise.
B. Lossy Reconstruction
Suppose that we are content with a lossy reconstruction, x n , at the legitimate receiver. In general, this reconstruction may be a random vector due to possible dependence on the random key bits. It is required, however, that d(x n ,x n ) ≤ nD with probability one, for some distortion measure d. Then, in Theorem 1, ρ LZ (x n ) should be replaced by the "LZ ratedistortion function" of x n , which is defined as
The definition of the IL property can be slightly relaxed to a notion of "nearly IL" (NIL) property, which allows recovery with small uncertainty for all large enough n. In particular, we shall assume that given w
must lie, with probability one, in a subset A n (w) ⊂X n , where
Perfect security should be defined as statistical independence between the cryptogram and both the source and reconstruction, i.e., the probability of any segment of {y i } should not depend on either x orx. Again, the direct is obvious, and it implies that at least asymptotically, there is nothing to gain from randomizing the reconstruction: The best choice ofx n is the one with minimum LZ complexity within the sphere of radius nD around x n . This conclusion is not obvious a-priori as one might speculate that a randomized reconstruction, depending on the key, may potentially be more secure than a deterministic one.
Note that we have not assumed anything on the distortion measure d, not even additivity. Another difference between Theorem 1 of the lossless case and its present extension to the lossy case, is that we are know longer able to characterize the rate of convergence of δ s (n), as it depends on the rate of decay of η m . In fact, we could have replaced the IL property we assumed in the lossless case by the NIL property there too, but again, the cost would be the loss of the ability to specify the behavior of δ n . 4 This might be the case if unambiguous reconstruction ofx n+i−1 i requires additional information from times later than t = n+i−1. For example, if the encrypter works in blocks of fixed size m,x n is deterministic, and n m, then by viewing the block code as finite-state machine as before, there might be uncertainty in not more than the m last symbols ofx n in case the last block is incomplete (e.g., when m does not divide n or the n-block considered is not synchronized to the m-blocks). In this case, |An(w)| ≤ |X | m , which is fixed, independent of n, and so ηn = O(1/n). n ? Due to space limitations, we will not provide detailed results concerning this case, except for a comment that for the case where the legitimate decrypter is also based on an FSM, it can be handled using the same line of thought as in [9] (and references therein), showing that the best general block code of length m is at least as good as any s-state encrypter-decrypter, up to a redundancy term that tends to zero as m → ∞ for every fixed s (see [8] ).
